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In-line or Insane? The Federal Circuit’s Recent 
Interpretation of Festo in Honeywell v. Hamilton 
Sundstrand 
Justin E. Gray* 
¶1 In June of 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) held in 
Honeywell v. Hamilton Sundstrand1 that the rewriting of a dependent claim in 
independent form, coupled with the cancellation of the original independent claim, was a 
narrowing amendment under the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.2  Under Honeywell, a patentee is presumptively 
barred from using the doctrine of equivalents for the additional element found in the 
original dependent claim.3  As rewriting dependent claims into independent form is 
currently a common practice,4 many patent practitioners will be upset by this decision.  
To the dismay of these practitioners, Honeywell was a correct interpretation of Festo.  
Unhappy practitioners who do not support the outcome of this case likely disagree with 
the Festo doctrine itself rather than the CAFC’s interpretation of it.5 
¶2 Part I of this note, explains the doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history 
estoppel, and a couple of important cases in this area of the law.  Part II, dissects and 
explains the Honeywell opinion.  Part III, analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. 
Finally, Part IV, considers the consequences of the Honeywell decision. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 This section provides a brief history of the purposes and functions of the doctrine 
of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel, followed by a discussion of significant 
cases concerning the doctrine of equivalents. 
 
* Mr. Gray is a 2006 Juris Doctor candidate at the Northwestern University School of Law and received his 
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  
He would like to thank Kraig Jakobsen for his suggestions for this note and Maria, Carol and Ed Gray for 
their encouragement and support. 
1 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
2 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) [hereinafter Festo]. 
3 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134. 
4 Id. at 1153. 
5 Of course I do not claim that I can read minds.  I only predict that many of these “unhappy 
practitioners” may realize by the end of this article that their animosity toward the Honeywell decision is 
misplaced. 
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A. Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel 
¶4 A patent can be infringed either directly or by the doctrine of equivalents.6  The 
doctrine of equivalents exists to cover those insubstantial and unimportant changes 
individuals may make to try to design around a patent.7  The doctrine of equivalents also 
exists because it is widely accepted that language sometimes cannot fully express a 
claimed invention with complete precision.8  There is a trade-off for a patent system that 
includes a doctrine of equivalents, namely uncertainty when trying to design around a 
patent.9 
¶5 The patent prosecution process creates a prosecution history, or “file-wrapper.”10  
The prosecution history is a collection of documents stored at the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) including the patent application and communications by 
the patentee and the USPTO with respect to the application.11  During patent litigation, 
the court uses this prosecution history to determine if any claims should be limited more 
than their natural language meaning suggests.  One reason for this analysis is to prevent a 
patentee from arguing that a claim means one thing during prosecution, and then argue 
something completely different during litigation.12  It appears unfair to allow a patent to 
issue based on limitations described by the patentee, and then allow the patent to be 
enforceable to its fullest extent as if those limitations were never needed for patenting. 
¶6 The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel mandates that, when a claim is 
narrowed during prosecution, the patentee is barred from utilizing the doctrine of 
equivalents to expand a claim’s scope during litigation regarding the element that was 
narrowed during prosecution.13  This narrowing can be made in a number of ways, 
including by argument to the examiner during prosecution and by adding language to the 
claim that narrows its scope.14  One of the main purposes of prosecution history estoppel 
is to combat the uncertainty that exists in a patent system that includes a doctrine of 
equivalents.15 
B. Significant Cases Before Honeywell 
¶7 The two most significant prosecution history estoppel cases decided prior to 
Honeywell were Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.  These cases set out the tests courts should use to 
 
6 DONALD S. CHISUM, 5A-18 CHISUM ON PATENTS 18.04 (2004). 
7 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
8 Festo, 535 U.S. at 731-32. 
9 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
10 5A-18 CHISUM, supra note 5, at 18.02[3]. 
11 Arnold B. Silverman & George K. Stacey, Understanding “Patentese”–A Patent Glossary, 48 JOM 
77, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9609.html (last visited November 
16, 2005). 
12 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734. 
13 See generally 5A-18 CHISUM, supra note 5, at 18.02[3].  For example, a patentee adds a limitation 
during prosecution that an element of a claim must be the color “red.” The patentee would be barred from 
later arguing that a similar device with the same element colored “blue” is equivalent to his or her patented 
device. 
14 See CHISUM, supra note 5, at 18.02[3]. 
15 Festo, 535 U.S. at 722. 
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determine whether a patentee is presumptively barred from asserting equivalents to 
specific claims. 
1. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 
¶8 Warner-Jenkinson involved a patent describing an ultrafiltration process for 
purifying dyes.16  During patent prosecution, the defendant added a phrase to a claim, 
restricting its pH level to “approximately 6.0 to 9.0” in order to avoid the prior art.17  The 
plaintiff subsequently developed an ultrafiltration process that used a pH level of 5.0.18 
¶9 The Supreme Court held in this case that the doctrine of equivalents was alive and 
well, and was not contrary to the 1952 revision of the Patent Act.19  The Court further 
held that, if an amendment is made during prosecution, the patentee bears the burden of 
showing that the amendment was made for a purpose other than patentability.20  If the 
patentee is unable to show that the amendment was made for a purpose other than 
patentability, the court should presume that prosecution history estoppel applies to the 
narrowing amendment.21 
¶10 The Court determined that adding language limiting the pH level of a process was a 
narrowing amendment.  The Court then concluded that the patentee was barred from 
asserting equivalents of the pH level because the patentee did not provide a reason for 
limiting the pH level to the 6.0 to 9.0 range.22 
2. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 
¶11 Festo involved patents regarding magnetically coupled rodless cylinders.23  During 
prosecution, Festo amended its application by adding a limitation requiring that the 
sleeve of the device be made of a magnetizable material.24  During a reexamination of 
one of the patents, Festo also amended a patent claim to include a pair of sealing rings on 
a piston.25  The patent examiner allowed each of these claims after they were amended.26  
The defendant subsequently developed a similar device; however, the defendant’s device 
used a non-magnetizable alloy for the sleeve and used a three-ring combination on the 
piston.27 
¶12 In the first CAFC opinion, the court held that, when prosecution history estoppel 
applied, the patentee was completely barred from asserting any equivalents of the 
 
16 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 23. 
19 Id. at 21.  One party raised an argument to the Supreme Court in this case that the existence of the 
doctrine of equivalents itself violates the 1952 Patent Act. 
20 Id. at 33. 
21 Id. 
22 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40-41. 




27 Id. at 729. 
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element at issue.28  On appeal from the CAFC, the Supreme Court first held that estoppel 
arises after an inventor amends the claims of his invention for a substantial reason related 
to patentability.29  The Court then stated that creating a narrowing amendment is a 
substantial reason relating to patentability.30  However, the Court rejected the CAFC’s 
complete bar approach to equivalents, stating that language itself still creates challenges 
of describing a patent after amendment.31 
¶13 The Supreme Court then gave a patentee three ways to rebut the presumption of 
prosecution history estoppel and the surrender of equivalents:32 
 
The patentee may show that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time 
of the application;33 
The patentee may show that the amendment bears no more than a 
tangential relation to the equivalent in question;34 or 
The patentee may show that there was some other reason why the patentee 
could not reasonably have been expected to have described the change in 
question.35 
II. STATEMENT OF THE HONEYWELL CASE 
¶14 This section first provides a brief background of the case.  The second portion of 
this section explains the reasoning of the majority and minority opinions in this case. 
A. Background of the Case 
¶15 Honeywell, a manufacturer of aerospace equipment, held two patents related to an 
aircraft auxiliary power unit.36  All of the asserted claims37 of the patents were originally 
dependent on other claims in Honeywell’s applications.38  These claims were originally 
rejected by the examiner as obvious in light of prior art.39  The examiner indicated that 
the claims would be allowable if rewritten into independent form.40  In response to the 
examiner’s request, Honeywell cancelled its rejected independent claims and rewrote the 
appropriate dependent claims into independent claims expressly incorporating the 
 
28 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 574-75 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
29 Festo, 535 U.S. at 735 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 
(1997)). 
30 Festo, 535 U.S. at 739-40. 
31 Id. at 737-38. 
32 Id. at 740-41. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 741. 
36 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134.  An auxiliary power unit is a small gas turbine engine most commonly 
used in the tail section of an airplane. 
37 By “asserted claims” I mean the claims later asserted by Honeywell in its suit against Hamilton-
Sundstrand. 
38 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1137. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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limitations of the rejected independent claims.41  The amended claims were allowed by 
the examiner and the patents issued.42  After Honeywell’s patents were granted, Hamilton 
Sundstrand (“Hamilton”) began manufacturing its own auxiliary power unit.43  
Hamilton’s device differed from Honeywell’s asserted patent claims with respect to one 
element common to the claims.44  This common element was an inlet guide vane 
limitation.45 
¶16 Honeywell filed suit against Hamilton in the District of Delaware claiming patent 
infringement both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.46  Honeywell eventually 
conceded that Hamilton’s device did not literally meet the inlet guide vane limitation.47  
Hamilton then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were 
narrowed by amendment during prosecution and therefore prosecution history estoppel 
barred all equivalents for the inlet guide vane limitation under Festo.48 
¶17 The district court, while noting that Hamilton’s argument had “superficial 
appeal,”49 rejected its motion for summary judgment.50  The district court held that, 
because the claims were merely rewritten into independent form, the “elements at issue 
were not amended”51 and “Honeywell did not give up an embodiment of the invention 
with the inlet guide vane” limitation.52 
¶18 The jury eventually found that Hamilton did not literally infringe Honeywell’s 
patents, but it did infringe the patents under the doctrine of equivalents.53  The court 
denied Hamilton’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial.54  The court 
also denied Honeywell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on literal infringement 
and motion for enhanced damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including expert witness 
costs.55 
¶19 Honeywell appealed the district court’s decision limiting actual damages,56 but it 
did not appeal the finding of no literal infringement.57  Hamilton cross-appealed, 
 
41 Id.  As has been mentioned, the practice of rewriting dependent claims into independent claims in 
response to a rejection was a common practice.  This practice will be discussed more in Part III, infra. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1136. 
44 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1136. 
45 Id.  The reader need not understand what an “inlet guide vane limitation” is in order to continue 
reading. 
46 Id. at 1137. 
47 Id. at 1136. 
48 Id. at 1138. 
49 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 99-309 GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2155, 
at *18 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2001). 
50 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 99-309 GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2155, at *10 
(D. Del. Jan. 8, 2001)). 
51 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 99-309 GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2155, 
at * 10-11 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2001). 
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challenging the district court’s determinations of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents and the decision rejecting its claims of invalidity.58 
B. The CAFC Decision 
1. The Majority–Patent Scope, Not Claim Scope 
¶20 On appeal, the CAFC first considered whether a narrowing amendment to a patent 
claim that adds an additional claim limitation creates a presumptive surrender of 
equivalents under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Warner-Jenkinson and Festo.59  The 
court noted that prosecution history estoppel may bar the patentee from asserting 
equivalents if the scope of the claims has been narrowed by amendment during 
prosecution.60  It also recognized that estoppel arises when an amendment is made to 
secure the patent and that amendment narrows the patent’s scope.61  After reviewing 
these two propositions, the court looked to the language the Supreme Court used in 
Warner-Jenkinson and Festo regarding claim amendments.62 
¶21 After reviewing the facts of Warner-Jenkinson, the CAFC concluded that amending 
to “introduce a new element” may give rise to a presumption of surrender.63  Festo 
indicated that amending to “add[] a new limitation” may also give rise to a presumption 
of surrender.64  Molding these two holdings together, the CAFC held that an amendment 
adding a new claim limitation constitutes a narrowing amendment that may give rise to 
an estoppel.65 
¶22 The court next addressed whether rewriting a dependent claim into independent 
form, coupled with the cancellation of the original independent claim, constitutes a 
narrowing amendment.  The court considered this question in light of when the dependent 
claim includes an additional claim limitation not found in the cancelled independent 
claim or circumscribes a limitation found in the cancelled independent claim.66  
Honeywell argued that prosecution history estoppel cannot apply where a dependent 
claim is merely rewritten into an independent claim.67  Although the patentee surrendered 
its broader independent claim, there is no presumption of surrender because the scope of 
the rewritten claims themselves have not been narrowed.68  However, Festo mandates 
that the proper focus is whether the amendment narrows the overall scope of the claimed 
subject matter.69  The court pointed to language in Festo demonstrating that rewriting a 
 
58 Honeywell, 370 F.3d 1139. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002)). 
61 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1139 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 736). 
62 Id. at 1140. 
63 Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33). 
64 Id. (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 728). 
65 Id. at 1141. 
66 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1139. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (citing Festo, 535 U.S. 736-37). 
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dependent claim into independent form creates a presumptive surrender if the amendment 
is “made to secure the patent.”70 
¶23 The CAFC decreed that it will not preclude the application of prosecution history 
estoppel by considering whether the scope of the rewritten claims have remained 
unchanged.71  By canceling the original independent claim and rewriting a dependent 
claim into independent form, the scope of the subject matter claimed in the independent 
claim has been narrowed to secure the patent.72  The court then observed the consistent 
application of this rule in post-Festo decisions.73 
¶24 Looking to its decision in Deering Precision Instruments v. Vector Distribution 
Systems,74 the court explained it had already held that canceling a broader independent 
claim and replacing it with a dependent claim rewritten into independent form was a 
“clear surrender of the broader subject matter.”75  This surrender of the broader subject 
matter presumptively barred application of the doctrine of equivalents.76  The court also 
looked to its decision in Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals v. Apotex,77 restating its holding that 
the rewriting of three dependent claims into one independent claim “surrendered subject 
matter that was originally claimed for reasons related to patentability.”78  The court 
therefore held in Ranbaxy that there was a presumption of estoppel.79 
¶25 In the court’s view, the approaches taken in Ranbaxy, Deering, and now Honeywell 
are each consistent with both Festo’s language and theory.80  In other words, a patentee’s 
decision to narrow claims through amendment may presumptively result in a general 
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim.81  Further, 
when the scope of the patent claim is narrowed to secure the patent, the court must regard 
the patentee as having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter.82  Thus, 
the court held that by rewriting a dependent claim into independent form and canceling 
the original independent claim, prosecution history estoppel applies and the patentee is 
presumptively barred from using the doctrine of equivalents.83 
2. The Dissent – Each Claim is its Own Invention 
¶26 Judge Newman wrote a dissenting opinion in Honeywell.84  She first noted that 
under paragraph four of 35 U.S.C. § 112,85 a dependent claim incorporates by reference 
 
70 Id. at 1142 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 736). 
71 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1142. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1143. 
74 Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Sys., Inc.,  347 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
75 Honeywell, 370 F.3d. at 1143 (quoting Deering, 347 F.3d at 1325). 
76 Id. 
77 Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
78 Id. at 1237 (quoting Deering, 347 F.3d at 1325). 
79 Id. at 1240-41. 
80 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1143. 
81 Id. (citing Festo, 535 U.S. 740). 
82 Id. at 1143-44 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 737). 
83 Id. at 1144. 
84 Id. at 1146 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.86  Judge Newman then argued that, by 
writing a dependent claim into independent form, neither the scope nor the content of the 
claim itself has been changed.87 
¶27 Referring to Festo II,88 Judge Newman stated that the majority had ignored its 
previous decision.89  She noted that, on remand, the CAFC stated that the first question in 
a prosecution history estoppel inquiry is whether an amendment has narrowed the literal 
scope of the claim in question.90  Next, she contended that if the amendment was not 
narrowing, prosecution history estoppel should not apply.91  She then argued that, 
because restating a claim in independent form does not narrow the literal scope of the 
claim, prosecution history estoppel should not apply in this case based on the language of 
the court in Festo II.92 
¶28 After finishing her discussion of Festo II, Judge Newman went on to discuss why 
dependent claims are used in the patenting process.93  Among the reasons given is that 
dependent claims are charged substantially lower fees compared to independent claims.94  
She then quoted from 35 U.S.C. § 28295 and stated that a dependent claim is 
independently valid and is not narrowed by the cancellation of an independent claim.96 
¶29 Judge Newman then concluded that rewriting a claim in accordance with paragraph 
four of 35 U.S.C. § 112 can never be a narrowing amendment.  Under her interpretation 
of the statute, rewriting a dependent claim into an independent claim does not narrow the 
claim’s scope.97 In her view it made a difference that the dependent claims at issue were 
not rejected by the examiner; instead the examiner simply objected to them.98  Since the 
dependent claims were always allowable, just objected to as to their form, their 
transformation from dependent to independent form is not a narrowing amendment.99 
¶30 Finally, Judge Newman discussed the differences between the Honeywell case and 
the holdings of Ranbaxy100 and Deering.101  She agreed with the holdings of Ranbaxy and 
 
85 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4 (2000) (“A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by 
reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.”). 
86 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1146 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 1147 (citing Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Hartness Int’l Inc. v. 
Simplimatic Eng’g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
88 Festo II refers to the last remand of the case to the CAFC.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
89 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1148 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. (citing Festo, 344 F.3d at 1366-67). 
91 Id. (citing Festo, 344 F.3d at 1366-67). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1148-49. 
94 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1148. 
95 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple 
dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of the other claims; dependent or 
multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.”). 
96 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1148 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 1150. 
98 Id. at 1151. 
99 Id. 
100 Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
101 Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Sys., Inc.,  347 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
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Deering because the dependent claims at issue in those cases limited the scope of an 
element in each of their respective independent claims.102  Arguing that Honeywell is 
different because the dependent claims at issue added new elements that were not 
amended or narrowed, she concluded that there was no surrendered territory of the new 
elements at issue, and thus prosecution history estoppel should not apply.103 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority Opinion – A Reasoned Decision? 
¶31 The majority opinion is lacking in two main areas.  First, the majority fails to 
consider whether the act of rewriting a dependent claim as an independent claim 
inherently satisfies the “some other reason”104 exception to the presumption of surrender.  
Second, the majority does not discuss why the cancellation of an independent claim 
affects a dependent claim even though, under the patent statute, each claim is a separate 
invention. 
¶32 Under Festo, a patentee may rebut the presumption of surrender by demonstrating 
there was “some other reason” the patentee could not reasonably have been expected to 
describe the alleged equivalent.105  The CAFC briefly described this concept in its Festo 
II decision, stating that the category itself is “vague” and “narrow” and “may be satisfied 
when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee was 
prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the claim.”106  
However, the CAFC has never found, under this category, that the presumption of 
surrender has been rebutted by a patentee.107  Further, since the court’s largely unhelpful 
dicta in Festo II, the CAFC has not provided additional guidance as to the meaning of 
“some other reason.” 
¶33 If there was some other reason that a patentee would not have been expected to 
describe alleged equivalents, following a simple instruction from the USPTO would 
appear to suffice.  As noted in Judge Newman’s dissent, rejection of independent claims 
is “common practice,”108 and patent examiners often suggest to patentees that certain 
dependent claims would be allowable if rewritten into independent form.  Since these 
suggestions are so commonly issued by patent examiners, patentees were not placed on 
notice (at least prior to Honeywell) that rewriting a dependent claim into independent 
form would presumptively bar the patentee from asserting equivalents to certain 
elements. 
¶34 The other significant problem with the majority’s opinion is that it demonstrates the 
inconsistency between the application of prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of 
 
2003). 
102 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1152 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. 
104 Festo, 535 U.S. at 741. 
105 Id. 
106 Festo, 344 F.3d at 1370. 
107 See Steven J. Rizzi, Proving Infringement – Recent Developments in the Federal Circuit’s 
Methodology for Construing Patent Claims, and Prosecution History Estoppel Post-Festo, 804 PLI/Pat 
345, 374 (2004). 
108 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1153 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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equivalents itself to claims.  The doctrine of equivalents is applied by looking at each 
element of each claim individually.109  Therefore, it is illogical to apply prosecution 
history estoppel, a theory that works hand-in-hand with the doctrine of equivalents, on a 
broader scale than a claim-by-claim analysis.  Allowing the cancellation of a claim to 
directly affect other claims in these instances is obviously not the intent of the USPTO.  
If the USPTO desired that claims should be allowed to affect one another in this way 
during prosecution, it would not have a practice of simply objecting to allowable 
dependent claims when their respective independent claims were rejected on some basis.  
The USPTO maintains this practice because claims should be considered independently 
from one another.110 
¶35 Further, during an infringement preceding, a patentee is not required to show that 
an infringer infringed every claim of a patent; rather, infringement of at least one claim is 
required for liability to attach.111  If there is such a desire that claims affect one another as 
suggested by the CAFC holding, courts would instead require patentees to show that 
alleged infringers infringe at least one independent claim of the patent in order to 
successfully prove infringement.  The reason courts do not engage in this practice is 
because all claims, independent and dependent alike, are treated as separate inventions 
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.  Section 112 undercuts the majority’s argument that dependent 
claims, each of which define a separate and distinct invention,112 may be limited by the 
mere cancellation of their respective independent claims, which also define their own 
inventions.113 
¶36 To be sure, the majority could have presented its overall argument in a clearer and 
more direct manner, but the argument at its core is correct.  The Supreme Court did hold 
in Festo that, when an amendment is made to secure the patent and that amendment 
narrows the patent’s scope, that amendment creates a presumptive surrender of 
equivalents.114  If an independent claim is cancelled and replaced with a narrower 
dependent claim, such an amendment obviously narrows the patent’s scope and is made 
to secure the patent.  Such an action is equivalent to simply amending the original 
independent claim by adding a limitation or element present in a dependent claim and 
then canceling that dependent claim.  Further, the mere act of canceling a claim narrows 
the patent’s scope.115  The above argument is the essence of the CAFC’s holding in 
Honeywell.  Logically, it is a correct one under the Supreme Court’s holding in Festo. 
B. The Dissent – Newman Does Not Respond to the Majority 
¶37 Judge Newman’s dissent is lacking in three areas.  First, she mentions, but does not 
comment on, the language in Festo discussing narrowing the scope of the patent.116  
 
109 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40. 
110 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
111 See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, at 8.01; Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 
972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
113 Id. 
114 Festo, 535 U.S. at 733-34. 
115 Assuming that the claim is not replaced with a broader claim. 
116 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1149 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Next, she unsuccessfully attempts to differentiate the facts of this case from those in 
Ranbaxy and Deering.117  Finally, she misconstrues the implications of the majority’s 
holding by postulating that patentees will be encouraged to write only independent claims 
after this decision.118 
¶38 In her dissent, Judge Newman addresses the specific language of Festo, stating that 
“[e]stoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment 
narrows the patent’s scope.”119  However, she goes on to argue only that the rewriting of 
a dependent claim into independent form does not narrow the scope of the claim.  She 
does not respond to the majority’s reliance on the words “narrows the patent’s scope” 
from Festo.120  Obviously, the majority and Judge Newman construe the holding of Festo 
differently. Unfortunately, no one can discern why Judge Newman disagrees with the 
majority hanging its hat on whether the amendment narrows the patent’s scope.  It is 
impossible to identify why Judge Newman disagrees with the majority’s reasoning 
because she never comments on the majority’s reliance on that specific language taken 
out of Festo. 
¶39 The next problem with Judge Newman’s dissent is her attempt to distinguish the 
facts of Honeywell from those in Ranbaxy121 and Deering.122  She explains that both 
Ranbaxy and Deering dealt with dependent claims that limited an element of the original 
independent claims.123  She agrees with the majority that both Ranbaxy and Deering were 
correctly decided under Warner-Jenkinson and Festo.124  However, she then argues that 
Honeywell’s dependent claims added new features not present in the original independent 
claims and therefore, the Honeywell situation is different from those in Ranbaxy and 
Deering.125  The major problem with this argument is that the amendment made in Festo 
added a new feature not present in the original independent claim, namely a pair of 
resilient sealing rings.126  It is contradictory to argue that the actual amendments127 made 
in Honeywell and Festo are in fact different types of amendments; both added new 
features not originally present in the independent claim.  Under this analysis, one must 
accept Ranbaxy, Deering, and Honeywell as a collective whole or concede that all three 
of these cases are decided incorrectly.  Therefore, this portion of Judge Newman’s 
opinion is not consistent with case law. 
¶40 Finally, Judge Newman incorrectly argues that the majority’s decision will 
encourage patentees to use only independent claims.128  Her argument is flawed because 
she has misconstrued the actual holding of the majority of the court.  To be sure, the 
stated holding of the majority is that there is a presumption of surrender when a patentee 
 
117 Id. at 1152. 
118 Id. at 1153. 
119 Id. at 1149 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 737). 
120 Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. 
121 Ranbaxy Pharms., 350 F.3d at 1235. 
122 Deering, 347 F.3d at 1314. 
123 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1152 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Festo, 535 U.S. at 728. 
127 Regardless of whether or not the amendments came from dependent claims. 
128 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1153 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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cancels an independent claim and replaces it with a dependent claim.129  However, the 
theory behind the holding makes it broader than what is actually stated.  The majority 
effectively held that any amendment made to a patent that narrows the patent’s scope will 
presumptively surrender equivalents of some applicable limitations or elements in other 
claims.  In other words, the cancellation of any claim will presumptively surrender 
equivalents to any limitation or element that would have further narrowed the canceled 
claim. 
¶41 Many who have written thus far about the consequences of Honeywell agree with 
Judge Newman that the decision will draw patentees away from utilizing dependent 
claims.130  In contrast, one scholar has simply stated that Judge Newman’s advice to 
patentees is “unsupported.”131  However, one article has correctly waded through 
Honeywell to conclude that the court intended to imply a broader holding.132  A broader 
holding of Honeywell makes practical sense in light of Festo because, if the CAFC held 
otherwise, patentees could effectively bypass prosecution history estoppel altogether 
through clever prosecution. 
¶42 An example of how clever prosecution could bypass prosecution history estoppel if 
the CAFC did not hold that mere cancellation of a claim triggers prosecution history 
estoppel follows.  Consider these two scenarios: 
 
Scenario I 
A patentee writes an application with two claims, the first being an 
independent claim and the second being a dependent claim.  The 
application consists of the following claims: 
Claim 1) Element A; 
Claim 2) Claim 1 further including element B. 
The examiner rejects Claim 1 as obvious but only objects to Claim 2, 
stating that it would be allowable if rewritten into independent form 
including all limitations of its respective independent claim.  The patentee 
then cancels Claim 1 and Claim 2 and instead writes independent Claim 3: 
Claim 3) Element A and element B. 




129 Id. at 1134. 
130 See Robert C. Faber, The Winning Mechanical Claim, 809 PLI/Pat 163, 244 (2004) (stating that 
because of Honeywell there may be some risk in using dependent claims); Kelly D. Talcott, Federal Circuit 
Takes Another Swipe at Doctrine of Equivalents, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, June 15, 2004, at 5 
(explaining that as a result of Honeywell there is a disincentive to include dependent claims in patent 
applications); Lewis R. Clayton, Doctrine of Equivalents, Drug Name Confusion, Privilege, NEW YORK 
LAW JOURNAL, June 21, 2004, at 1 (predicting that future patentees will react to Honeywell by avoiding 
dependent claims). 
131 Stephen B. Maebius & Harold C. Wegner, The Honeywell Nail in the Festo Coffin: A Narrowing 
Amendment Does Create a Presumption of Prosecution History Estoppel, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 417, 
418 (2004). 
132 William M. Atkinson, Kirk T. Bradley & S. Benjamin Pleune, Losing Ground The Extension of Festo 
In Honeywell v. Hamilton Sundstrand, INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW COMM. NEWSLETTER, Spring, 2005, at 
10. 
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A patentee writes an application with two independent claims.  The 
application consists of the following claims: 
Claim 1) Element C; 
Claim 2) Element C and element D. 
The examiner rejects Claim 1 as obvious and allows Claim 2.  The 
patentee cancels Claim 1.  The examiner allows the patent to issue. 
 
¶43 If Honeywell does not hold that mere cancellation of a claim triggers prosecution 
history estoppel, the patentee in Scenario I will be able to assert equivalents while the 
patentee in Scenario II will be presumptively barred from asserting equivalents.  The 
patentee in Scenario I will be presumptively barred from asserting equivalents of element 
B, but the patentee in Scenario II will be allowed to assert equivalents of element D.  As 
this example shows, clever claim drafting would allow the patentee in Scenario II to 
completely bypass the Honeywell ruling.  Such a result would “exalt form over 
substance,” which the CAFC does not support.133 
¶44 It should be noted that if Honeywell is construed in this way, Judge Newman 
correctly postulates that patentees will be driven to only use independent claims.  
Accepting Judge Newman’s argument will enable patentees to easily work around 
Honeywell if they pay more money to the USPTO for independent claims.  Under this 
scenario, Honeywell would become an empty decision with the only consequence being a 
greater cost to inventors to secure their patent rights.  It is logical to assume that the 
CAFC would be unhappy with this outcome and would find a way to close this loophole.  
This potential loophole is closed if the holding is instead read to mean that the mere 
cancellation of a claim triggers prosecution history estoppel.  Construing the holding in 
this way provides that the patentees in both Scenarios I and II will be presumptively 
barred from utilizing equivalents of elements B and D of their claims, respectively.  This 
result seems logical given that the patentees in Scenarios I and II reached the same claim 
in substantially the same way. 
¶45 Although Judge Newman’s dissent has a number of problems, it does articulate one 
important point.  Judge Newman discusses one of the major interpretation problems 
between prosecution history estoppel and the patent statute.  35 U.S.C. § 282 states that 
each claim of a patent shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other 
claims.134  In Judge Newman’s words, “[e]ach claim defines a separate invention whether 
or not written in independent form; and its validity stands or falls separately.”135  
However, the idea that prosecution history estoppel allows claims to affect each other 
seems to contradict Section 282.  This dichotomy can be confusing. 
¶46 It may make sense that by assuming two claims are treated as separate inventions, 
if one claimed invention is rejected, this rejection should not affect the other claimed 
invention.  Following this logic, if an “independently claimed” invention is rejected, this 
rejection should not affect a related “dependently claimed” invention.  Further, if two 
inventions are instead written as independent claims, even with many similar elements, 
the rejection of one claimed invention should not have an effect on the other. 
 
133 Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 260 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
134 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). 
135 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1148 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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¶47 Although Judge Newman does bring up this important point, her dissent would 
have made much more sense if she had discussed three things.  First, she should have 
responded to the majority’s reliance on specific language in Festo.  Next, she should have 
further clarified why Honeywell should be treated differently than Deering or Ranbaxy 
(or should have simply stated that Deering and Ranbaxy were wrongly decided).  Finally, 
she should have discussed how patentees could easily bypass the holding of the majority. 
C. Can’t We All Just Get Along? 
¶48 The major difference between the philosophies of the majority and Judge Newman 
is the interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Festo.  The majority focuses on 
the language stating that “[e]stoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the 
patent and the amendment narrows the patent’s scope.”136  However, Judge Newman 
focuses on the fact that each claim is a separate invention and simply rewriting a 
dependent claim into independent form does not narrow the claim’s scope, and is 
therefore not a narrowing amendment.137 
¶49 If Judge Newman is correct, then rewriting a dependent claim into independent 
form, coupled with the cancellation of the original independent claim, will not trigger 
prosecution history estoppel as long as the original dependent claim adds a “new feature” 
not present in the original independent claim and does not further limit an element of the 
original independent claim.138  Such a result would produce an irreconcilable dichotomy 
between the holdings of Deering and Ranbaxy and the holding of Honeywell.  Further, 
such a holding would open the door for patentees to bypass Festo.  Before the Honeywell 
decision, if a patentee amended a rejected independent claim by introducing a new 
feature into it, the patentee would be presumptively barred from asserting equivalents of 
the new feature under Festo.139  Under Judge Newman’s approach, patentees could get 
around Festo by first introducing new dependent claims into applications during 
prosecution that add new features to rejected independent claims.  Patentees would then 
cancel rejected independent claims and replace them with the dependent claims that add 
new features.  By drafting claims in this way, patentees would be able to reach the same 
result as they would before Honeywell but this time they would be able to use the 
doctrine of equivalents for the new feature originally described in a dependent claim.  
The fact that patentees could bypass this portion of the Festo doctrine is not a desirable 
result. 
¶50 Let us assume that one accepts the premise that in Festo the Supreme Court’s focus 
was on whether the scope of the patent itself had been narrowed.  It then follows that any 
amendment narrowing the scope of a patent (and being made to secure the patent) 
triggers prosecution history estoppel in some way.  What would such an amendment look 
like?  The simplest amendment to consider for such a question would be the cancellation 
of a claim.  When a claim is cancelled, assuming that it is not replaced with a broader 
claim, the scope of the subject matter covered by the patent has in fact been narrowed.  
Following this logic, such an amendment would trigger prosecution history estoppel. 
 
136 Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. 
137 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1149 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 1152. 
139 Festo, 533 U.S. at 741. 
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¶51 Through its decision, the CAFC is telling patentees that it equates the action of 
amending a rejected independent claim by adding a new element to the action of 
canceling a rejected independent claim and replacing it with a dependent claim that adds 
a new element.  There is no practical difference between these two methods of 
amendment and, therefore, it makes sense to treat them the same way.  The only 
difference is that in one, the new element is not disclosed in the claims immediately but is 
still supported by the specification, whereas in the other, the element is disclosed in a 
claim right away and is also supported by the specification.  The overall scope of the 
patents created by these two methods of amendment is exactly the same, and therefore 
they should be treated equally.  Until practitioners and judges recognize that the focus of 
Festo is on the overall scope of the patent itself, the debate over when a patentee is 
presumptively barred from asserting equivalents will continue. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES 
¶52 This section describes two types of consequences of the CAFC decision.  The first 
section discusses consequences to patentees, and the second section explains the effect of 
the CAFC decision on the USPTO and district court judges. 
A. Possible Consequences to Patentees 
¶53 The next logical question asked is what effect the CAFC’s holding in Honeywell 
will have on patent prosecution and litigation.  A number of scenarios are possible, but it 
is impossible to predict the future of patent practice with precision.  However, it is clear 
that clever claim drafting will be required to navigate through the swamp of presumptive 
estoppel rules. 
¶54 In one possible view of the future, we could accept Judge Newman’s postulation 
that patentees will be driven to use only independent claims.140  To those who believe that 
the CAFC’s holding only encompasses rewriting a dependent claim in independent form 
coupled with canceling the original independent claim, Judge Newman’s idea makes 
sense.  However, as explained above, Honeywell should instead be interpreted to hold 
that mere cancellation of a claim can trigger prosecution history estoppel.  For patentees 
who use this track, taking the route of only using independent claims will not solve the 
problem.  Regardless, there will be an uncertainty as to the scope of the Honeywell 
holding that can only be dissolved if the CAFC further refines its Honeywell holding in a 
future case or if the Supreme Court decides to clarify the situation.141 
¶55 Since Judge Newman’s approach leaves much to be desired, patentees may simply 
stick to drafting narrower claims than they would otherwise attempt to patent.  This 
approach would secure use of the doctrine of equivalents but has the drawback of a 
smaller world of literal infringement.  In using this approach, patentees will need to take 
even more time researching prior art and drafting claims in order to be assured that their 
original submitted claims will not be rejected.  At the very least patentees will want to be 
 
140 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1153 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
141 The Supreme Court decided in June of 2005 not to hear an appeal of the CAFC Honeywell decision.  
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 125 S. Ct. 2928 (2005). 
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able to write allowable claims without having to make a narrowing amendment to the 
claims.  It is unclear whether patentees will prefer this alternative. 
¶56 Patentees may decide to give up on trying to secure claims that may utilize the 
doctrine of equivalents.  By following this approach, patentees may try to secure the 
broadest possible claims, hoping that fear of literal infringement of broad patent claims 
will keep infringers away.  However, these patentees may find themselves in a more 
precarious position than before Honeywell; namely their broad claims may be rejected 
and they will be forced into narrow claims that have no doctrine of equivalents protection 
due to narrowing amendments. 
¶57 As described in an article in the Intellectual Property Newsletter of Summer 2004, 
patentees may increasingly turn to means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim 
drafting pursuant to paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112.142  Such an approach, which will 
statutorily protect certain equivalents, may help some patentees.  However, for the claims 
that cannot be written in that language, this approach will be of no help. 
¶58 Regardless of which approach practitioners use, they will likely amend claims less 
and argue admissibility of claims more, while making sure not to trigger prosecution 
history estoppel through argument.  Such an approach will be necessary in order to 
protect not only the original independent claim, but also the use of doctrine of equivalents 
on all of the independent claim’s dependent claims.  This practice will require more time 
than was needed in the past because of the greater use of argument during prosecution.  
This in turn will increase the cost of prosecuting a patent. 
B. Consequences to the USPTO and District Court Judges 
¶59 Another possibility is that the USPTO and its examiners may reconsider how they 
treat objections to dependent claims that would otherwise be allowable if rewritten into 
independent form.  As Judge Newman notes, “the writing of broader claims and their 
cancellation during prosecution is, or was, the common practice.”143  However, since the 
CAFC has taken its position (albeit the correct one under Festo) regarding the rewriting 
of dependent claims, USPTO examiners may not want to continue the practice of simply 
“objecting” to dependent claims when it would otherwise be appropriate.  Unfortunately, 
there is not much the USPTO can do to protect practitioners from prosecution history 
estoppel.  Further, the role of the USPTO is not to give advice to practitioners concerning 
the ramifications of their actions. 
¶60 Honeywell will have a grave effect on district court judges attempting to determine 
the meaning of claims during Markman hearings.144  It will be difficult, or nearly 
impossible, to determine what elements in which claims would be affected by a 
 
142 William M. Atkinson, Kirk T. Bradley & S. Benjamin Pleune, Losing Ground The Extension of Festo 
In Honeywell v. Hamilton Sundstrand, INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW COMM. NEWSLETTER, Spring, 2005, at 
10. Section 112 paragraph 6 allows patentees to express an element in a combination claim as a means or 
step for performing a function without reciting structure, material, or acts.  Section 112 paragraph 6 claims 
are construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
143 Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1153 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
144 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  Judges construe patent claims 
before the formal start of the proceeding during what have been named “Markman” hearings. 
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cancellation of a claim.145  Since whether a patentee is presumptively estopped from 
asserting equivalents is a question of law that is reviewed without deference,146 the 
reversal rate of district courts in making such a determination will likely increase.  
Further, since claim construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo,147 the 
reversal rate of district court claim construction will also go up due to the increasing 
confusion surrounding how claims must be interpreted. 
¶61 At least one thing is clear, soon a case will be appealed to the CAFC where a 
patentee writes all of its claims as independent claims, expecting to get around Honeywell 
by doing so.  This patentee will have one of its broader independent claims cancelled due 
to a rejection by the examiner and will then try to argue that the simple cancellation of an 
independent claim has no bearing as to the scope of another independent claim.  If and 
when this case finds its way to the CAFC, the court will hold that the mere cancellation 
of an independent claim is a narrowing amendment under Festo, and therefore certain 
elements of the remaining independent claim may be presumptively barred from using 
the doctrine of equivalents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶62 The debate over whether Honeywell was correctly decided comes down to a 
fundamental disagreement as to the holding of Festo.  If someone believes that the 
correct focus under Festo is whether the scope of the patent has been narrowed, that 
person will agree with the Honeywell decision.  That person may also go so far as to 
agree that the mere cancellation of a claim triggers prosecution history estoppel.  
However, if one believes that the correct focus under Festo is whether the scope of a 
claim has been narrowed, that person will likely disagree with the Honeywell decision. 
¶63 This paper has argued that Honeywell is in line with Festo.  Considering the plain, 
unambiguous language given to us by the Supreme Court, the mere cancellation of a 
claim triggers prosecution history estoppel.  Unfortunately, at this point it is unclear 
whether the CAFC intended this result.  In the future, either the CAFC or the Supreme 
Court will need to clarify the Honeywell holding and thereby greatly assist both 
practitioners and district court judges.  Even though Honeywell is correctly decided, 
application of the decision poses many problems for both patent practitioners and judges. 
 
145 Especially a cancellation of a dependent claim. 
146 Ranbaxy, 350 F.3d at 1240. 
147 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
